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Naturalism and is Opponents
JOSEPH SPENCER
E
ver since Descartes began his search for certainty in philosophy, many of 
the great philosophers have taken up this quest. One solution, proposed 
by WVO Quine in his 1969 essay, Naturalized Epistemology, claims 
that we must refrain from studying epistemology in philosophy. Quine 
claims that our study of knowledge must only occur in the ﬁeld of psychology 
and that we should refrain from talking about these issues in philosophy. As 
one can imagine, Quine’s essay was met with much criticism and anger among 
philosophers. Most notably, Hilary Putnam provides a devastating critique of 
naturalized epistemology in his essay, Why Reason Can’t be Naturalized. In this 
paper, I present both men’s views, and argue that Putnam’s response, while not 
perfect, does demolish the bases for Quine’s arguments about knowledge. 
Naturalized epistemology has spawned one of the great debates among 
philosophers for almost half a century.  Should we eliminate epistemology 
as a ﬁeld of philosophy and, instead, look at it from the view of psychology? 
This problem stems from an even greater problem, the problem of skepticism, 
the rational doubt of what we can know and how much we can know it. 
Only recently has the debate encountered this new version: naturalized 
epistemology.  In this paper, I explain naturalized epistemology and the 
problems that arise from it.  
Throughout the history of epistemology, philosophers have debated about the 
ways to go about deﬁning what knowledge is. Many, like Descartes, believed 
that knowledge consisted mainly in some form of justiﬁcatory belief. This 
idea later received the acronym, JTB, justiﬁed true belief. It was this tendency 
to search for justiﬁcation, which the philosopher, W. V. Quine, spoke out 
against in his landmark essay, Epistemology Naturalized. 
Quine decided that we needed to move epistemology away from its more 
“normative” aspects, and instead center it in the ﬁeld of psychology. He 
believed that epistemology, as previously understood, could never lead us 
to the answer of the question epistemologists asked, “What is knowledge?” 
So, Quine took the route that he claims Hume suggested, that we link 
epistemology with a form of psychology, since science is veriﬁable by nature, 
while philosophy is not. 
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Now, as a brief explanation, the “normative” refers to the standard 
way of looking at epistemology. These normative claims rely on 
their stability as a basis for knowledge. What Quine proposes is 
that epistemology needs to be moved away from any accepted 
foundation. What this will effectively accomplish is to turn 
epistemology into an ambiguous science.
As one can expect, Quine’s notion of epistemology being 
naturalized and transformed into just another science, was met 
with much resistance. Many philosophers, most notably Hilary 
Putnam, argued that we should not undertake Quine’s challenge, 
since he abandoned philosophy and the nature of justiﬁcation. 
Putnam argued that Quine’s puzzling resistance to Cartesian 
justiﬁcation, echoing Hume’s skepticism of knowledge, would 
lead to a complete elimination of epistemology as it had been 
understood for centuries. 
The debate between supporters of naturalism in epistemology 
and naturalism’s opponents has raged ever since Quine 
published his essay. Jaegwon Kim, in his recent essay, What 
is Naturalized Epistemology?, continues the opposition to 
Quine’s view. Kim speciﬁcally attacks Quine’s assertions about 
justiﬁcation. Quine, for Kim, by losing justiﬁcation, has taken 
all knowledge out of the ﬁeld of epistemology, which defeats 
its original purpose. What follows in the wake of removing 
justiﬁcation, for Quine, is a reliance on the connection between 
evidence and theory. However, Kim claims that evidence and 
justiﬁcation are, in fact, one and the same. So, you cannot have 
one without the other.
Inherently, this debate is about justiﬁcation and its meaning. 
If we are to abandon justiﬁcation because it is difﬁcult to 
deﬁne, then, as Quine has done, we must ﬁnd a new means of 
looking at knowledge. However, if, as Putnam and Kim argue, 
we believe that it may be difﬁcult to deﬁne justiﬁcation, but 
the search for its true deﬁnition has not ended, then we must 
retain epistemology as a ﬁeld of philosophy and not allow it to 
become another ﬁeld of science.
W. V. Quine set off a ﬁrestorm when he published his essay, 
Epistemology Naturalized. He believed that he had found 
the solution to all the problems epistemologists had faced 
for centuries. He argued that epistemology must no longer 
be concerned with the justiﬁcation of knowledge, since that 
had proved too difﬁcult, and must instead become part of 
psychology. 
Quine argued this point for a number of reasons. First, he 
believed that “epistemology is concerned with the foundations 
of science” (Quine, 528), so it seemed only natural to Quine that 
epistemology should be linked with a ﬁeld of science. Secondly, 
the appeal of science lies in the fact that it is intelligible, which 
epistemology had not been, Quine believed, until he linked 
epistemology with psychology. Another reason is that Quine 
believed, as Hume had, that if we brought ﬁelds of philosophy 
into ﬁelds of science, we would be able to come to know what, 
in this case, knowledge actually is. 
Quine began his explanations of naturalized epistemology by 
pointing out all the problems with epistemology. By moving 
systematically through each of the options philosophers 
have offered to account for an understanding of knowledge, 
Quine believes that he has disproven them. By focusing on 
mathematics as an example, Quine points out how many 
people have trusted that they are on the right path, since math, 
is intelligible; however, Quine’s conclusion is that even though 
math has aspects that may be “philosophically fascinating, … it 
does not do what the epistemologist would like of it; it does not 
reveal the ground of mathematical knowledge, it does not show 
how mathematical certainty is possible” (Quine, 529). This 
shows that he believed that the quest for a ﬁrm foundation in 
math failed as well. It proved that there are limitations to what 
we can do and how we can use, formal logical proofs in relation 
to math, and conversely, the world around us.  
Quine holds Rudolf Carnap’s work of proving a “rational 
reconstruction” in the utmost contempt. He does not believe 
that there is any worth in “this creative reconstruction, this 
make-believe” (Quine 530), since these concepts do not 
prove anything relating to knowledge itself. These “creative 
reconstructions,” according to Quine, will only lead to 
imperfect translations, which will not bring us any closer to 
knowledge. For Quine, these imperfect translations would 
be far worse than placing epistemology under the auspices of 
psychology.  
What Quine claims led him to developing this new relationship 
for epistemology was the realization that “a statement about 
the world does not always or usually have a separate fund of 
empirical consequences that it can call its own” (Quine 533). 
So, he is suggesting that we no longer look for justiﬁcation, and 
that we should only search for explanations for the origin of 
the event. In laying out his new program, Quine concedes that 
“philosophers have rightly despaired of translating everything 
into observational and mathematical terms…But [Quine] 
think[s] that at this point it may be more useful to say rather 
that epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and 
a clariﬁed status” (Quine 533). He is here claiming that the 
only way we can use epistemology is to use it as a psychologist 
would. 
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Part of Quine’s reasoning for the marriage of epistemology 
and psychology is that “we can now make use of empirical 
psychology” (Quine 533). He claims that this is the best 
alternative, since he is “after an understanding of science as an 
institution or process in the world” (Quine 534), and with this 
new program we can make induction clearer than before. So, 
in effect, Quine has given us a new form of science. This new 
form is one in which ordinary, normative claims are thrown out 
and all we are left with is an ambiguous approach to scientiﬁc 
problems.
Towards the end of the essay, however, Quine returns to discuss 
“observation sentences,” which he claims are sometimes able 
to assist in epistemology in its original form and the new 
naturalized form. The importance of these “observation 
sentences” rests on the fact that they point toward a physical 
object. It may seem somewhat strange that he raises this point 
late in his paper, but as we shall see later described by Hilary 
Putnam, these sentences are just one of the many important 
features of Quine’s thought.
Many philosophers vociferously disagreed with Quine’s 
viewpoints about epistemology and, even with his arguments 
against other philosophical endeavors. So, in the next section, 
we will examine Hilary Putnam’s arguments against naturalism 
in epistemology.    
With the ﬁrestorm raging around W. V. Quine’s Epistemology 
Naturalized, one of the more articulate philosophers of the 
anti-naturalism crowd, Hilary Putnam, wrote his critique of 
Quine entitled, Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized. In the essay, 
Putnam took on each of Quine’s arguments, point by point, to 
make the best case possible against naturalized epistemology. In 
presenting his arguments, Putnam takes on his opponents in a 
slightly more indirect manner than Quine did.
Putnam points out that “those who raise the slogan 
‘epistemology naturalized’…generally disparage the traditional 
enterprises of epistemology… [So] in this respect, moreover, 
they do not differ from philosophers of a less reductionist kind” 
(Putnam 314). What Putnam is doing is allowing the readers 
the opportunity to judge for themselves the difference, if any, 
between the proponents of naturalized epistemology, and those 
they condemn. By setting these comparisons, Putnam believes 
that we will we come to the truth of whether a naturalized 
epistemology can work. 
The ﬁrst possible form of a naturalized epistemology Putnam 
observes is evolutionary epistemology. This, he claims, cannot 
work in the end, since the “approach assumes, at bottom, a 
metaphysically ‘realist’ notion of truth: truth as ‘correspondence 
to the facts’ or something of that kind” (Putnam 314). The 
notion expressed does not work because, Putnam claims, we do 
not have the ability to judge the truth of any statements dealing 
with anything we do not take part in constructing, and if this 
is not bad enough, trying to come up with an idea of capacities 
would be even worse, for Putnam.
Putnam next goes after the Reliability Theory of Rationality 
and cultural relativism. When dispatching of the concept 
of a reliability theory, Putnam uses the same argument he 
used against evolutionary epistemology, namely that “it too 
presupposes a metaphysical notion of truth” (Putnam 316). 
In discussing cultural relativism, however, Putnam employs 
a more nuanced method of enquiry. Now, at ﬁrst glance, it 
would seem that Putnam, with his view that
“Truth claims” are relative to the language in which they are 
uttered, would be in favor of a culturally relativistic approach 
to epistemology. He is not favoring this approach since he 
explains that his conception of truth as relative to language 
“does not mean that a claim is right whenever those who 
employ the language in question would accept it as right in its 
context” (Putnam 316). Putnam argues that there must be a 
balancing of two points. First, that “talk of what is ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ in any area only makes sense against the background of 
an inherited tradition” and, second, that “traditions themselves 
can be criticized” (Putnam 316). Therefore, what he is here 
claiming is that no matter what kind of moral standards a 
particular culture may hold, rationality is not determined by 
those standards; it is beyond human constructions. Cultural 
relativism is dangerous for Putnam because it does not rely on 
reason. A cultural imperialism follows directly from cultural 
relativism, in that it also does not rely on reason, and it relies 
solely on one’s culture.
After touching upon all these points, Putnam ﬁnally directly 
attacks Quine’s arguments. Putnam claims that he only begins 
discussing Quine after explaining away all these previous 
ideas “because Quine’s views are much more subtle and much 
more elaborate than the disastrously simple views we have 
just reviewed, and it seemed desirable to get the simpler views 
out of the way ﬁrst” (Putnam 320). He decides that it is best 
to discuss what he sees as the dichotomy of two dominant 
“strains” in Quine’s thought separately: the positivistic strain 
and the ‘epistemology naturalized’ strain. 
In Quine’s positivistic writings, Putnam points out his 
attachment to “observation sentences,” those sentences that, 
for Quine, deﬁne what is real in the world. Putnam ﬁnds 
this attachment strange, as “Quine’s ideal systems of the 
world are ﬁnitely axiomatizable theories, and contain standard 
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mathematics” (Putnam 321). In this system everything could 
be justiﬁed, which, obviously, cannot be done in the real world, 
but Putnam believes that it cannot be done in an ideal material 
world, either. Since, for Quine, the structure of reality matters, 
Putnam posits that Quine’s views are extremely inconsistent, 
and this is the biggest problem with positivism in general. 
Now, the reason why this problem arises is that both Quine 
and Putnam are trying to ﬁnd a foundation for epistemology. 
Quine seems to have abandoned the original foundation, 
whereas Putnam wants to keep it. Putnam then moves on to 
naturalized epistemology itself. 
Putnam observes that in Quine’s essay, he has abandoned the 
search for justiﬁcation through observation sentences, and, 
instead, has decided that epistemology cannot be understood 
merely as a ﬁeld of philosophy; it must now become part of 
psychology, and thus, a science. The major claim, which 
Putnam makes, is that “Quine’s position is sheer epistemological 
eliminationism” (Putnam 322), since Quine removes any 
forms of justiﬁcation from epistemology, which, for Putnam, 
is removing the whole purpose of the ﬁeld from itself. Now, 
Putnam admits that Quine has publicly declared that he 
never meant to “rule out the normative” in his naturalized 
epistemology; Putnam asserts that the reason this claim makes 
sense is because Quine viewed the normative as “the search 
for methods that yield verdicts that one oneself would accept” 
(Putnam 322). If this is true, then Quine cannot be blamed 
for ruling out the normative. However, as we will see, this 
sentiment is either not true or only partially true. 
Putnam explains that we cannot rule out the normative 
because “if one abandons the notions of justiﬁcation, rational 
acceptability, warranted assertability, and the like, completely, 
then ‘true’ goes as well, except as a mere device for ‘semantic 
assent’” (Putnam 322). What he is warning us is that if we 
follow Quine’s logic of naturalized epistemology; we can do 
away with any idea of what can be true. For Putnam, there is 
more work to be done, and none of it can be done if we do 
not have a notion of ‘true’, and this is where the danger of 
naturalism lies. 
The problem of normativity was one that both Quine and 
Putnam dealt with in their essays, and in later works. Putnam 
even concedes, in Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized, that 
Quine believed that he was not eliminating the normative in 
naturalized epistemology. Despite this acceptance of Quine’s 
personal belief, Putnam still had grave doubts about where 
naturalized epistemology would lead us, and of Quine’s, 
apparently, mistaken belief that he could retain the normative 
as part of naturalized epistemology. Clearly, even today, the 
contention remains that Quine did in fact eliminate the 
normative by naturalizing epistemology. 
Naturalized epistemology leads to a loss of the normative since 
it is based on assumptions that allow for the thinker to shift 
the foundations he or she is basing his or her ideas upon in 
epistemology. This occurs since, as Putnam points out, “if one 
abandons the notions of justiﬁcation, rational acceptability…, 
and the like, completely, then ‘true’ goes as well” (Putnam 
322). His assertion is true, but it is important to note his 
emphasis on the word, completely. This danger occurs when 
we “completely” throw out the normative. Putnam clearly 
believes that Naturalized Epistemology rules out the normative, 
but at the same time, he is far more concerned with where the 
ideas of Naturalized Epistemology will lead others, rather than 
what Quine lays out exactly in his essay. Quine’s claim that he 
was not eliminating the normative is at best, misguided, and at 
worst, dishonest. There is no way I can see for Quine to defend 
himself from the claims that he is eliminating the normative.     
An idea that Quine can eliminate the normative, yet still keep 
the importance and signiﬁcance of knowledge for science, is 
something that has been debated ever since he ﬁrst penned 
his essay. For most anti-naturalists, it is clear that there are 
grave problems once you have eliminated the normative in 
epistemology. First, if knowledge can be something that is merely 
relatively true, it cannot lead to an intelligible knowledge of the 
fact on the part of the observer. Relativity clouds the ability 
to know what it is that one is observing. Second, according 
to Putnam, all that happens to our understanding of “true” 
in this new sense, is that we look at it as “a mere mechanism 
for switching from one level of language to another” (Putnam 
322). What he means is that all we are doing is changing the 
language of the debate, but not actually answering the question 
asked. 
The question of normativity remains a major debate to this day. 
With naturalists and anti-naturalists going back and forth over 
its importance, it is no wonder so many people ﬁnd the debate 
to be un-resolvable. Nevertheless, it is only through constant 
debate that either side can come closer to a sense of what is the 
truth about epistemology. 
I do have a deﬁnite opinion of this debate, and it should be 
clear from my overview of the debate and the emphasis I placed 
on the normative where my allegiance lies. I am a convinced 
anti-naturalist. I have great reservations about Epistemology 
Naturalized. Just as it is the greatest problem for Putnam, I 
ﬁnd it entirely irresponsible. I believe it has irreparably harmed 
philosophy by eliminating the normative in epistemology and 
removing epistemology itself from the ﬁeld of philosophy. Not 
only has it harmed philosophy, though, it has also harmed 
science, since it has removed any notions of understandable 
foundations for science to rest upon. 
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Furthermore, I do not see how Quine can link his skepticism 
to that of Hume. David Hume was not only skeptical of 
what philosophy could tell us, as Quine points out. He was 
also skeptical of what scientiﬁc knowledge was. Linking 
epistemology to psychology, a ﬁeld of science, does not appear 
to settle any of the epistemic problems Hume observed, despite 
Quine’s protests to the contrary.
I do not entirely agree with Hilary Putnam, either. His ideas 
betray a lack of belief in a metaphysical reality, which I cannot 
accept, and he is much too conciliatory towards Quine. Putnam 
left many lines of thought unexplored in his essay. Nevertheless, 
his cautious approach is better than no opposition at all to 
Quine’s idea. I have no doubt that naturalism can only bring 
about more confusion than knowledge. I only hope that with 
this ongoing debate, those who oppose naturalism can once 
again gain greater clarity in their defense of true philosophy. 
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